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The roof of a building after a BLU-97 strike in Iraq. Deminers are clearing
unexploded munitions so the building can be used as a shopping centre.

The cluster munitions campaign, following
the precedent of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, is beginning to make
an impact on state views of banning or
restricting cluster munitions. This article

Targeting Landmines Focuses on Latin America

examines the history behind the fight to ban

Targeting Landmines is a project created by Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá of MediaQuatro
designed to begin a global discussion on and generate governmental support for mine awareness,
mine clearance and victim assistance initiatives. The group presented its first exhibit for the
Targeting Landmines project in January 2006 in Caracas, Venezuela. The exhibition took place
as part of the World Social Forum.

or restrict cluster munitions and its ties to the

The body of work uses photos, articles and documentary materials to disseminate information
and spark interest for the Latin American landmine problem. Partial funding for the project
has been provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, but more support will be
necessary soon for the project to fulfill its goals. Through extensive work with several humanitarian organizations operating in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, MediaQuatro will continue to
document the breadth of the landmine issue in Latin America.
To learn more about Targeting Landmines, view some of the riveting images, and contact the
artists, visit: http://mediaquatro.sites.uol.com.br/minas-eng.html.
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have not yet rallied in similar numbers to the cluster-munitions effort.
The Cluster Munition Coalition, formed in late 2003, has approximately 170 members. Many of the CMC’s members and leadership,
however, are seasoned campaigners. Familiar to ICBL-watchers are
Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action
(UK), Mines Action Canada and Pax Christi, who are among those
sitting on CMC’s 10-member steering committee.
The CCW
The ICBL and its dynamic partnership with like-minded APM
ban states (the Ottawa Process) was an innovative and collaborative
way of quickly moving the ban agenda forward. Disappointment
with the existing Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons2
consensus rule (where a single recalcitrant state can dilute or block
Convention provisions supported by the majority) led to the new parallel process.
The parties to the Ottawa Process focused on the idea that humanitarian impact can trump military utility.3 This idea was not new
because international humanitarian law and an array of treaties from
the mid-1800s onwards already referred to obligations towards civilians during conflict, containing such ideas as proportionality, distinction, discrimination, military necessity and humane treatment.
The CMC effort has followed the precedent of the ICBL, struggling through the slow CCW process and challenging the stragglers.
If cluster-munition campaigners were unprepared for the inadequacy
of the prevention measures of the Convention’s Protocol V 4 that were
agreed to by governments, they have sober expectations about their
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host-country buy-in to the solution. The
Department of State has done an admirable
job in constructing a highly efficient, responsive, accretive and timely program for
weapons removal and abatement.
In conclusion, there is an irrefutable relationship between landmines and other remnants of war. Their origins are completely
independent; their technology and cost
components are quite different; their general
manufacturing and deployment sources are
different; but both excel as weapons since
the effectiveness of any weapon depends
upon two factors:
1. Its ability to damage or destroy men
and materiel
2. The morale effect of its use, or threat
thereof, upon the enemy
Both of these threats have many names,
and I am certain someone somewhere is
thinking up a new name for landmines and
other explosive remnants of war. Regardless
of the new tortured phrases we will be forced
to endure, let us not forget that “A rose by
any other name would smell as sweet,” but
these threats are the thorns of the rose.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Abatement, which utilizes country assessments. As an enhancement to the standard
assessment process, the WRA program seeks
to develop concurrent plans, in coordination with the various country hosts, to assist
using a fast-track approach so that serious
threats can be addressed much more expeditiously than with other methods. Under
this methodology, as country assessments
reveal threats, the information is shared
with the host country and discussions include possible solutions to the threats. As
the assessments continue, the solution sets
are fine-tuned, and it quickly becomes obvious which option is best to mitigate the
specific threats. Once the solution is mutually agreed upon by the Department of State
and the host country, the same teams that
are conducting the assessments can be expanded to handle the implementation.
The benefits of this improved approach
are numerous but include faster response
to identified threats, a more cost-effective
mitigation of threats, a fast-tracked timeline (the same teams expand to handle the
solution; there is a minimal learning curve
for personnel) for response, and ongoing

ICBL. The author also discusses the most
recent developments in the process to ban
or restrict cluster bombs.
by Robin Collins [ World Federalist Movement–Canada ]

T

he end of the Cold War has a lot to do with the greater attention the world now gives to humanitarian grievances.
Unexploded ordnance impact data has been accumulating,
but without the precedent of the anti-personnel mine campaign and
the Ottawa Convention,1 the Belgians would probably never have
considered banning cluster munitions in 2006.
Most of the ICBL’s 1,400 members have limited themselves to
APM eradication, victim assistance and other Convention goals, but

Red spray paint warns villagers of a cluster bomb along a path in Ton Neua Village,
Laos, 1994.
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Explosive Remnants of War
Even before the Ottawa Convention was
signed, deminers and mine-clearance and
other organisations recognized as self-evident
a danger from weapons with similar characteristics to anti-personnel mines. There
came a proposal from the International
Committee of the Red Cross that campaigners and governments should look at all explosive remnants of war, a grouping that initially
included unexploded cluster munitions, antitank/anti-vehicle mines and APMs, antihandling devices, artillery shells, bombs,
grenades, booby traps and even missiles.8
Explosive remnants of war captured the
boundaries of the contagion, but not all
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for most of the casualties in some postconflict environments.”12
By a process of elimination, then, the
effort to address ERW has quickly come to
focus primarily on one subgroup (aside from
APMs) with the most serious humanitarian
impact: cluster munitions.
Failure Rates
Cluster casualties were sometimes
the consequence of munitions that erred
from their target or that were dropped
close to noncombatants—but it is their
high failure-to-detonate rate that makes
them potential ERW. Official failure
rates of cluster munitions often varied
from the numbers recorded in the real

Unexploded cluster munitions litter grazing land in Xieng Khouang province, Laos, 1994.

the military utility of cluster weapons as
an area-effect weapon, readily admitted
current models were problematic. (They
did not, however, commit to their immediate withdrawal.10)
A significant strike against cluster munitions is their rivalry with APMs for highest
number of unintended victims. In parts of
the world (Laos, for instance), the sheer number of failed cluster munitions poses a hazard as great as or greater than anti-personnel
mines.11 A 2002 survey by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining found the “data available on the
casualties of ERW and percentage of UXO
cleared again shows a greater bias toward
the two main groups—anti-personnel mines
and cluster bomblets (submunitions). It is
probably the case that they are responsible

world. Rae McGrath reported in his resource book, Landmines and Unexploded
Ordnance,13 that the 1966 tests of BLU-26
submunitions at Nellis Air Force Base in
ideal circumstances revealed a 26-percent
failure-to-explode rate after deployment.
Colin King, an international landmine
and explosive ordnance disposal consultant,
pointed out, “Gulf War I clearly demonstrated a major discrepancy between performance during military ‘acceptance tests’ and
operational use. …[N]early 2,000 electronic mines remained unexploded in the U.S.
clearance sector alone, despite achieving
near-perfect results during testing.”14
Similarly, demining consultant Andy
Smith notes, “Formal tests take place on
hardpan and with the pilot able to deploy
the CBU [cluster bomb unit] in the manner

required by the manufacturer. Typically
he will be flying at the correct speed, orientation and altitude to ensure optimum
performance. In a combat situation, that
same pilot may be operating at night and
under enemy fire. The target area may include buildings or woodlands and the
ground surface may vary from concrete to
swamp. Submunitions may be dispersed at a
height that does not allow them to complete
the arming process before landing; they may
strike trees or buildings that prevent them
landing in the intended orientation. They
may also land on a surface that swallows
them up.”15
Emergence of a Cluster Munitions
Campaign
At the Lugano, Switzerland, conference
of experts organised by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in 1976, 13
states16 concentrated on the lethal footprint
of cluster munitions and the horrific consequences for civilians nearby. However, core
cluster-bomb user-states did not sign onto
the Lugano statement and there was no reference to detonation failure rates. The critical experience in Laos and Vietnam was that
cluster bombs had been targeted at or near
noncombatants.17 Many of the deaths from
UXO were yet to come. While the Lugano
conference did not establish a cluster-bomb
campaign, it (and the Lucerne conference)
did lead, ultimately, to the creation of the
CCW in 1980. Except through advocacy by
the Mennonite Central Committee (with
clearance work by Mines Advisory Group in
Laos) and Human Rights Watch, the problem of cluster munitions might have fallen
entirely out of sight. The campaign spark
came somewhat later.
Ottawa Convention Impact
Thirty million submunitions were
dropped in the 1991 Gulf War, resulting
in thousands of untargeted victims—and
yet there was no sustained public outcry.
Cluster munitions casualties in Kosovo
(1999) and Afghanistan (2001), however,
did receive attention, as did munition
failure rates (normally an esoteric subject
area).18 The news media were quick to
highlight the similarity in appearance of
cluster munitions and yellow food packages dropped into Afghanistan (a confusion
that actually had rare, if any, consequences).19 In Canada, where I live, members
of Parliament had to respond to inquiries
about cluster bombs in question period.20
Government ministers were forced to make
contradictory statements. The European
Parliament, for its part, took a stand in

favour of a moratorium. So what had
changed since the Gulf War?
The link between renewed interest in
cluster munitions and the international success of the APM ban campaign is unmistakable. The ICBL and Ottawa Convention had
highlighted the unacceptability of weapons
detonated by innocent victims either directly (death and injury) or indirectly (socioeconomically). All weapon use after the Ottawa
Convention bears a new level of scrutiny.21
For many campaigners, this was the best
possible result.
The Pace Picks Up
At an International Committee of the
Red Cross experts’ meeting in Nyon,
Switzerland, in September 2000, explosive remnants of war were officially

campaigning for a moratorium on cluster
munitions (sometimes by themselves) for a
couple of years, most other member groups
were quiet.25 There was some concern that
formally linking a cluster-munitions initiative to the landmine campaign would threaten partner governments that had signed the
AP Mine Ban Convention. Would linkage jeopardize universalising the Ottawa
Convention? Some governments had to
wonder if the campaign was now spilling
over into non-APM weapons. Where would
it stop?
The contrary argument, which was
the one that eventually led to the ICBL’s
December 2001 statement,26 was that the
credibility of a campaign in pursuit of a
norm against victim-activated weapons
would be put in jeopardy without formally
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unexploded ordnance posed an equal risk.
Some were more visible and more prevalent and others were less likely to explode
inadvertently. Some had greater military
utility, which made their prohibition more
difficult. The ERW nomenclature has been
a useful and creative approach to underlining similar humanitarian effects caused by
a broad range of munitions. It resulted in a
new CCW Protocol (Protocol V), but one
with few obligations on member states.
Governments eschewed specific preventive
measures for fear that more of their arsenal
would subsequently be scrutinised, restricted or prohibited. The United Kingdom, in
its March 2005  presentation9 to the ERW
experts’ working group, while defending
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prospects now at the CCW. At a minimum,
preventing UXO meant establishing acceptable failure rates, banning certain fusing configurations and destroying aging
stockpiles. But no mandatory measures to
prevent UXO (including cluster munitions)
appeared in the final text. Instead, it stated,
“Each High Contracting Party is encouraged to take generic preventive measures
aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war” and “Each High
Contracting Party may, on a voluntary basis, exchange information related to efforts
to promote and establish best practices”
(emphasis added).4
Protocol V is far off the mark, but campaigners continue to press governments
to sign on as a first step to recognising a
problem. Some nongovernmental organisations now mull over the idea of an “Ottawa
Process” to deal with cluster munitions.
While not discounting any future process
outside the CCW, Human Rights Watch
has called for a new protocol focussed on
cluster munitions: “The mandate and the
protocol should be broad, and should deal
with both the technical reliability issues and
the targeting and use issues. … [A] new protocol should prohibit the use of unreliable
and inaccurate submunitions and require
their destruction. The billions of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions already
in the arsenals of more than 70 nations
are the primary humanitarian concern.
They must never be used in order to avoid
a humanitarian and socioeconomic disaster
exceeding that created by millions of landmines globally.”5
Human Rights Watch, one of a handful
of early adopters,6 was willing to call for a
moratorium on cluster munitions in 1999,
and in 2003 it named a specific list of problematic cluster weapons that should not be
used in Iraq because of their known hazardous failure rates.7

A BLU-26 cluster bomb peeks out of a rice paddy dike in Nanou Village, Laos, 2000.

put on the agenda. Colin King’s breakthrough report, Explosive Remnants of
War: A Study of Submunitions and Other
Unexploded Ordnance,22 was circulated.
Nongovernmental organisations and governments met informally, and there was “widespread recognition”23 of the ERW problem
and a need to address it.
In December 2001 at the final plenary
review conference of the CCW, the ICBL
issued its first clear statement in support
of those calling for “a moratorium on the
use, production and trade of cluster munitions.”24 This was a delicate moment for the
ICBL, where many felt that their priority
was completing work in progress on APMs.
While the Mennonite Central Committee
and Human Rights Watch had been publicly

recognizing and condemning the clustermunitions problem. The ICBL decided to
encourage its “members and supporters to
work to alleviate the humanitarian impact
of cluster munitions and other explosive
remnants of war.”26
Recent Developments
Virgil Wiebe, a consultant to the
Mennonite Central Committee and law
professor at the University of St. Thomas,
described a key presentation by the U.S. representative at the CCW in November 2005 
as “a jaw-dropping moment.” The official
borrowed heavily from a recent task force report that had found no identifiable “comprehensive approach—empirical observation or
otherwise—to determine and document
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Near Erbil, Iraq: the CBU was released at too low an altitude and these BLU-97 submunitions hit the ground
without arming. Their damaged state makes them unpredictable and very dangerous.

operational combat failure rates of U.S. munitions.”27 This is a remarkable admission
because it has broader implications than just
concerning cluster munitions. But consistent
with nongovernmental organisation and
field-based evidence, it also confirms actual
CBU failure rates might have little relationship with official “test” claims.28
In March 2006, Timothy McCormack, a
professor of international humanitarian law
at the University of Melbourne Law School,
led a review of the responses to a survey by
CCW States Parties regarding their views of
the relevance of IHL principles to explosive
remnants of war. McCormack concluded
that the CCW’s Protocol V should be sufficient to address the problem of ERW—but
if not, and the problem “only increases in
severity,” the call for a ban on cluster bombs
should not be unexpected. Significantly,
the report also argued that whatever the
outcome, “the onus is on user states to
demonstrate that such weapons can be used
consistently with the binding obligations of
IHL” (emphasis added).29
The announcement that the Belgian
government had adopted a comprehensive
ban on cluster munitions sent a ripple of
optimism through the Cluster Munition
Coalition, and thanks to good Belgian timing, it arrived just in advance of the CCW
meeting of States Parties in March 2006. In
one swoop, the Belgians have changed the
complexion of the cluster munitions campaign. While they have set the bar high,30
they have also reinforced the belief that an
international ban on something, not just
clean-up measures, is now possible. The final
ban text has been adopted by both houses of
parliament in Belgium as of this writing.
While the most comprehensive ban is
in Belgium (Austria is entering a parliamentary debate on a clusters moratorium),
several other states have made their reserva-
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tions known: “Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,31 Poland,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States have plans to withdraw from
service or have destroyed certain types of
cluster munitions.”32 Germany and Belgium
are considering a strategy of narrowing the
definition of cluster munitions so that a ban
excludes advanced models that are not expected to be problematic.33 The United States
is not Belgium, but even the U.S. military,
having distributed its own task-force report
in advance of the CCW, seems to be willing to consider major changes in its arsenal.
For the first time in a long time, a significant
international restriction on certain cluster
munitions appears to be within reach.
Continuing Debates
From the start, many ICBL campaigners had difficulty condoning technical
measures to address high cluster-munition
failure rates. They campaigned against
self-destruction, self-deactivation and selfneutralisation solutions for APMs and worry
that supporting technical fixes now may
compromise an absolutist principle defended
earlier. However, what if major players refuse
to join an all-out ban on cluster munitions,
even if they support a comprehensive ban on
anti-personnel mines?
Controversy also surrounds the debate
over what an “acceptable” failure rate might
look like. Less than 1-percent failure is a
typical cut-off point, but is also arbitrary. A
very small percentage of a very large number can still be a humanitarian disaster,
albeit a much-reduced danger compared
with that produced by a 10- to 30-percent
failure rate.
Yet, there may be a harm-reduction imperative to prioritising destruction of certain
more problematic “worst culprit” munitions,

whatever the future holds for a complete
ban. There is consensus within the CMC
for a moratorium on use, production and
trade of cluster munitions until their humanitarian problems have been resolved—
but not everyone has been in favour of
prioritising.34 Does highlighting the bulk of
the problem legitimate what remains? Some
worry that humanitarian law will be ignored
and they have suggested that cluster munitions might be used more indiscriminately
if their failure rates are “fixed.” Will militaries switch to other bombs, causing more
casualties, if cluster munitions are banned entirely?35
An interesting reverse-onus framework
outlined by Landmine Action (UK) and
consistent with one of the conclusions of
the McCormack report is that governments
should recognise all cluster munitions are
assumed prohibited unless users can “opt in”
with a guarantee that a particular munition
can be used safely.36 Might that approach fit
nicely with the destruction of legacy munitions with the highest failure rates?
A final point: If the failure rates of cluster
munitions were reduced to nil or next to nil,
would there remain a humanitarian problem
on a scale sufficient to sustain a campaign
for a comprehensive international ban?
See Endnotes,” page 110

Mines and ERW
Due to the history and nature of conflicts in
the Ethiopia/Eritrea area, cleanup presents
specific considerations and hazards. The
lessons learned by the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Mine Action
Coordination

Centre
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rem-nants of war cleanup are presented,
as well as recommendations on clearance
operations for situations with mixed mine/
ERW like that in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
by Bob Kudyba [ UNMEE MACC ]
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ines and explosive remnants of war continue to affect
many parts of the world. One such area is the Horn of
Africa, where wars have continued for the better part of
the 20th century. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1320 formally
established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
in November 2000. At the same time, the U.N. Security Council
formally established a Mine Action Coordination Centre within
the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The resolution
requires the MACC to coordinate and provide technical assistance for
humanitarian mine action activities in the TSZ1 [temporary security
zone] and area adjacent to it.
History of the Mine and ERW Problem
The mine and ERW problems of Eritrea and Ethiopia stem from
three historical periods. Eritrea was colonised by the Italians in the
19th century. During the Second World War, Italian and British
forces fought a number of battles across Eritrea, culminating in a
major siege on the town of Keren in 1941, which lasted nearly three
months. These battles were fought in a conventional manner, consisting of aerial bombardments, artillery, small-arms fire and mine
emplacement. Certain areas around Keren are considered hazardous
today due to suspected contamination by mines and unexploded ordnance, particularly in the hills surrounding the township. Keren was
the scene of a major battle again during the independence war years
between 1961 and 1991.
After the Second World War, Eritrea was governed by Great
Britain until the early 1950s, when it was handed over to Ethiopia
to be part of the federation system; annexed by Ethiopia, Eritrea became its northernmost province. There was a resurgence of Eritrean
nationalism in the early 1960s when the Eritrean population began

an insurgent campaign for independence against Ethiopian forces.
This rebellion gradually developed into a more conventional war as
the Eritreans gained support for their cause, won key battles and held
ground. This struggle for independence lasted 30 years and affected
the entire country. The Eritrean struggle for independence is possibly
one of the most successful examples of a liberation war. Eritreans are
justifiably proud of the establishment of their country, as it was won
at great cost to the population and without “outside” help or support
from other nations.
After the state of Eritrea was established in 1993, following a
U.N.-monitored referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly for independence, the relationship between Eritrea and
Ethiopia was cordial. This relationship continued until several issues
soured it, including the introduction of a new currency, the nakfa,
which replaced the Ethiopian birr. The situation eventually deteriorated into a war lasting from 1998 to 2000 over non-demarcated borders. Then in 2000, Algiers brokered a peace accord.
This border war was an intense conflict, with both sides employing conventional war strategies that developed into a carefully
planned and executed military operation reminiscent of World War I.
The war was fought at terrible cost with an estimated 70,000 people
killed and thousands more displaced. As a result of this conflict, the
entire border area between the two countries from the Sudan in the
west to the Djiboutian border in the east remains contaminated with
mines and ERW today.
Interrelationship between Mines and ERW
As a result of these conflicts, most of Eritrea and the northern
areas of Ethiopia remain contaminated with mines and conventional
ERW. In a recent incident, a truck driver collecting stones for a building site was killed when his vehicle drove over a landmine on a vacant
site just off a main road near the capital, Asmara. This mine was a
remnant of the independence war years, quite possibly overlooked
when the area was vacated.
In examining the history of the conflicts that have engulfed the
region, mines and ERW are interwoven menaces rather than separate
entities. It is not safe to just walk out to unexploded ordnance or
an abandoned tank and attempt to remove or destroy items without
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